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IMPROVING THE LAW THROUGH CODIFICATION:
ADOPTION OF THE UNIFORM TRUST CODE
IN NORTH DAKOTA
†

KIRSTEN FRANZEN

††

AND BRADLEY MYERS

ABSTRACT
While trusts have existed under the law for centuries, the common use
of trusts for estate planning, probate avoidance, and wealth management
dates back only a couple of decades. The increase in trust usage has, unfortunately, also served to expose gaps, opaqueness, and inconsistencies that
developed under the common law. As the first generation to make liberal
use of trusts in estate planning begins to pass away, courts will likely have
to regularly wrestle with questions of trust interpretation, implementation,
and correction. On August 3, 2000, the Uniform Law Commission (ULC)
approved the Uniform Trust Code (UTC). The ULC undertook drafting of
the UTC in order to codify the various common law rules that applied to
trusts, to clarify an area of law considered “thin” and “fragmentary,” and to
provide states with a body of law that was “precise, comprehensive, and
easily accessible.” North Dakota adopted the UTC in 2007. This article
discusses the development of the UTC, reviews the history of trust law in
North Dakota, and examines the adoption of the modified UTC’s treatment
of trusts under North Dakota law. Although North Dakota law is not a hotbed of trust conflict, the UTC should bring additional clarity to situations
where conflict arises.
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INTRODUCTION

On August 3, 2000, the Uniform Law Commission (ULC)1 approved
the Uniform Trust Code (UTC).2 Prior to the UTC, trust law differed
among the states, and controlling law in many states was unclear.3 The
UTC provided the first uniform scheme for the law of trusts.4 The ULC
amended the UTC in 2001, 2003, 2004, and 2005.5
While trusts have existed under the law for centuries, the common use
of trusts for estate planning, probate avoidance, and wealth management
dates back only a couple of decades.6 The increase in trust usage has,
unfortunately, also served to expose gaps, opaqueness, and inconsistencies
that developed under the common law. As the first generation to make
liberal use of trusts in estate planning begins to pass away, courts will likely
have to regularly wrestle with questions of trust interpretation,
implementation, and correction. If the UTC does its job, attorneys, judges,
and citizens will find the creation, administration, and enforcement of trusts
easier and more predictable. The benefits of the UTC cannot be realized,
however, unless states enact the UTC. North Dakota adopted the UTC in

†

Assistant Attorney General, North Dakota.
Associate Professor of Law, Randy H. Lee Professor of Law, University of North Dakota
School of Law. Professor Myers has been a member of North Dakota’s delegation to the Uniform
Law Commission since 2007.
1. The Uniform Law Commission has been known for most of its existence as the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The alternate name of the Uniform Law
Commission was added to the organization’s Constitution in 2007. UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION
REFERENCE BOOK 107 (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws eds., 2010-2011).
2. UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note (amended 2005), available at http://www.nccusl.org/
(follow “Final Acts and Legislation” hyperlink; then select “Trust Code” in drop-down menu; then
follow “Final Act” hyperlink).
3. Id. While the UTC represents the first comprehensive attempt to codify trust law, many
previous acts have codified particular aspects of trust law, for example the Uniform Principal and
Income Act. See John H. Langbein, Why Did Trust Law Become Statute Law in the United
States?, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1069, 1080 (2007).
4. Langbein, supra note 3, at 1069.
5. Unif. Law Comm’rs, A Few Facts About the Uniform Trust Code, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, http://nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fsutc2000.asp (last visited Dec. 29, 2010). The UTC has been adopted by Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. In 2010, the UTC was introduced before
the legislature of New Jersey. Id.
6. See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER, ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS,
TRUSTS & ESTATES 543-44 (8th ed. 2009). The rise of the revocable trust as a will substitute is
tied to the publication of How to Avoid Probate!. See generally NORMAN F. DACEY, HOW TO
AVOID PROBATE! (1st ed. 1965). Trusts now are “big business.” For 2006 the banks that are part
of the federal reserve system reported holdings of $760 billion in roughly 1.25 million accounts.
In 2007, trusts that must file Form 1041, which excludes revocable trusts, reported $142.5 billion
in gross income on more than 2 million returns.
††
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2007.7 This article discusses the development of the UTC, reviews the
history of trust law in North Dakota, and examines the adoption of the
modified UTC’s treatment of trusts under North Dakota law.
II. TRUSTS: DEFINITIONS AND PURPOSES
“A trust may be defined as a fiduciary relationship in which one person
holds a property interest, subject to an equitable obligation to keep or use
that interest for the benefit of another.”8 Persons within the fiduciary relationship have a duty to act for the benefit of the others and may not profit at
the expense of the others in the relationship.9 Minimally, a trust includes a
trustee who holds the property, one or more beneficiaries for whom the trust
property is intended to benefit, and the trust property itself.10 Generally, a
trust instrument documents the trust’s purpose and terms, identifies the
trustees and beneficiaries, and sets forth each party’s rights and
responsibilities.11
The UTC applies to express trusts—trusts that are created from an
express intention by the creator of the trust, the settlor.12 Trusts are used by
individuals, primarily for estate planning purposes, and among businesses,
for commercial purposes.13 For example, family members may place property in a trust benefitting other family members in order to ease the transfer

7. 2007 N.D. Laws 1896-1941. The Uniform Law Commission amended the UTC at its annual meeting in July 2010 to add a new section 113 specifically dealing with the question of when
a trust has an insurable interest. The new section was deemed necessary because of the holding in
Chawla v. Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Co., No. 05-1160, 2005 WL 405405 (E.D. Va.
2005), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 440 F.3d 639 (4th Cir. 2006). The trial court in the case ruled
trusts in Maryland can never have an insurable interest on a person’s life. While the appellate
court vacated the ruling as “unnecessary,” the Fourth Circuit did not rule that a trust could have an
insurable interest. The ULC, recognizing insurance trusts are considered a vital instrument for
estate planners, wanted to conclusively settle the issue. The North Dakota Legislature is expected
to take up this amendment during the 2011 session.
8. AMY MORRIS HESS ET AL., TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1, at 2 (3d ed. 2007).
9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003).
10. Id.
11. HESS ET AL., supra note 8, § 1.
12. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 102; HESS ET AL., supra note 8, § 1 at 14. Express trusts are
distinguished from resulting trusts and constructive trusts. A resulting trust is a “reversionary,
equitable interest implied by law in property that is held by a transferee, in whole or in part, as a
trustee for the transferor or the transferor’s successors in interest.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS, supra note 9, § 7. A constructive trust is used as a legal remedy and is created when “a
person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the
ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain the property.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 1 cmt. e (2003).
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS ch. 1 intro. note (2003). Some states require certain
business trusts to register with the state in a manner similar to other incorporated and unincorporated entities. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3801-26 (2007). The ULC also adopted the
Uniform Statutory Trust Entity Act in 2009, although to date it has not been adopted in any state.
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of assets or to derive tax benefits.14 Similarly, employers commonly keep
pension fund assets in trust for the ultimate benefit of employees.15
The use of trusts, primarily in the context of estate planning, has recently increased in popularity.16 This is, in part, due to the trust’s utility in
avoiding probate, minimizing taxation, maintaining confidentiality, minimizing administrative expenses, and providing protection against will contests.17 The popularity of trusts in estate planning is also attributable to the
financial prosperity of the 1990s and the increase in life spans.18 Trusts are
becoming so common they are increasingly identified as legal entities.19
However, the UTC is “directed primarily at trusts that arise in an estate
planning or other donative context,” and not at the regulation of
“commercial trusts.”20
III. THE PURPOSE OF THE UTC
The ULC drafted the UTC in response to the increasing use of trusts in
estate planning and in commercial transactions.21 Before approval of the
UTC, trust law was primarily found in the common law and was represented by the Restatements of the Law of Trusts.22 Some states codified

14. See Duemeland v. Norback, 2003 ND 1, ¶¶ 3-4, 655 N.W.2d 76, 77-78 (illustrating the
use of trusts for tax planning purposes).
15. Morris v. Job Serv. N.D., 2003 ND 45, ¶ 19, 658 N.W.2d 345, 351.
16. Cynthia J. Wooden, The Supreme Court of Nebraska Determines a Court’s Power to
Authorize a Conservator to Exercise an Incompetent Settlor’s Reserved Rights to Amend or
Revoke Her Trust in In re Guardianship and Conservatorship of Garcia, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV.
47, 47 (2002).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. a (2003); see, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE. § 1302.1-01(9) (2009) (defining “person” to include trusts under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 14-02.4-02(13) (2009) (defining “person” to include trust in context of
domestic relations); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 23-20.3-02(10) (2002) (defining “person” to include trust
in the context of hazardous waste management).
20. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 102 cmt. (2006). Commercial trusts, also identified as “business
trusts,” “common law trusts,” “Massachusetts trusts,” and “statutory trusts,” operate as business
entities. See UNIF. STATUTORY TRUST ENTITY ACT prefatory note (2009). While these entities
would still be governed by the UTC, even in jurisdictions that explicitly treat them as business
entities, it does so only as necessary to supplement the more specific provisions of state law
applicable to commercial trusts. See UNIF. STATUTORY TRUST ENTITY ACT § 105 (2009).
21. UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note (amended 2005); see also John H. Langbein, The
Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1108
(1984) (noting “[p]robate, our court-operated system for transferring wealth at death, is declining
in importance” while the popularity of non-probate will substitutes, including life insurance, pension accounts, joint accounts, and revocable trusts, grows).
22. N.D. LEG. COUNCIL, UNIFORM TRUST CODE—BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM, Judiciary
Comm., 59th Sess., at 1 (2005), available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/59-2005/docs/
pdf/79025.pdf [hereinafter N.D. BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM].
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trust law with varying degrees of treatment.23 The statutory schemes of
New York, California, Georgia, Indiana, and Texas were recognized as the
most thorough.24 North Dakota and several other states codified some
components of trust law, but those statutory schemes were incomplete and
generally involved only basic elements of trust creation and administration.25 Furthermore, North Dakota’s trust laws were based on the California
Civil Code, and the majority of the statutes had not changed since their
adoption in 1877.26 North Dakota’s pre-UTC scheme had “fairly minimal
requirements for trusts and . . . a limited amount of case law on the topic.”27
The ULC promoted adoption by emphasizing that the UTC would promote
uniformity, simplify the law, and update obsolete code provisions.28
IV. ULC METHODOLOGY AND UTC DEVELOPMENT
The ULC has been in existence since 1892. The stated purpose of the
organization is to “promote uniformity in the law among the several States
on subjects as to which uniformity is desirable and practicable.”29 The
ULC consists of commissioners from all fifty states, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
The only limitation on ULC commissioners is that they be members of the
bars of their respective states30 and that they be appointed commissioner by
some authority in the state.31
North Dakota’s Commission on Uniform State Laws must consist of: a
lawyer from North Dakota; the dean or a faculty member from the University of North Dakota; a law-trained judge; a member of the North Dakota
House of Representatives; a member of the North Dakota Senate; a member
of the Legislative Council Staff; and any person elected a life member of
the ULC.32 Any residents of the state who have been on the Commission
for at least five years may also continue to represent the state.33 The
23. Martin D. Begleiter, In the Code We Trust—Some Trust Law for Iowa at Last, 49 DRAKE
L. REV. 165, 172-73 (2001).
24. HESS ET AL., supra note 8, § 7, at 67, 69.
25. See id., § 7, at 70-71 (discussing states having nominal statutory trust treatment prior to
the development of the UTC).
26. N.D. BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM, supra note 22, at 1.
27. Id.
28. Uniform Trust Code Study: Hearing Before the Judiciary Comm., 2005 Leg., 59th Sess.
1 (N.D. 2005), available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/59-2005/interim-info/minutes/
ju091205minutes.pdf [hereinafter Uniform Trust Code Study].
29. UNIF. LAW COMM’N CONST. art. I, § 2.
30. Id. art. II, § 5.
31. Id. art. II, § 2.
32. N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-55-01 (2009).
33. Id.
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members of the Legislative Assembly on the Commission are appointed by
the Legislative Management.34 The member of the Legislative Council
Staff is appointed by the Chairman of the Legislative Management.35 The
Governor appoints all other members, other than life members who require
no appointment.36 The North Dakota Century Code empowers the North
Dakota Commission to submit bills directly to the legislature when it is in
session.37 When the legislature is not in session, the Commission may submit recommendations for enactment to the Legislative Management for its
review and recommendation.38
The ULC drafted the UTC over seven years.39 The ULC began by
charging a study committee with the task of determining whether a uniform
system of trust laws would be prudent.40 Maurice Hartnett, who served as a
Justice on the Delaware Supreme Court and who had extensive involvement
in trust law, chaired the study committee and later chaired the drafting
committee.41 The drafting committee sought the advice of several groups,
including the American Bar Association (ABA), the ABA’s Section of Real
Property Probate and Trust Law, the American College of Trust and Estate
Counsel, and the American Bankers Association.42
The ULC adopted the UTC in August of 2000, with the official comments completed on April 25, 2001.43 The ABA House of Delegates added
its approval of the final text in February of 2001.44 On May 17, 2002,
Kansas became the first state to adopt the UTC.45 The Kansas adoption
included some non-uniform amendments to the UTC, though efforts were
made to maintain the uniformity of the UTC as adopted.46

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. § 54-55-04.
38. Id.
39. David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy
Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 145 (Spring 2002).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Unif. Law Comm’rs, supra note 5.
44. Robert T. Danforth, Article Five of the UTC and the Future of Creditors’ Rights in
Trusts, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2551, 2554 (2006).
45. Kansas—First UTC State, UTC NOTES (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State
Laws, Chicago, Ill.), May 2002, at 1, available at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/UTCNotes2Q02.
pdf.
46. Id.
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Several states began the process of adopting the UTC shortly after its
approval.47 The path to adoption was not always without controversy. The
Arizona Legislature adopted the UTC in 2003.48 The adoption was delayed
and then entirely repealed in 2004 due to criticism from a small group of
lawyers.49 The two primary issues of concern were that the UTC diminishes creditor’s rights that existed under the common law and that the UTC
requires trustees to disclose trust information to beneficiaries, thus interfering with settlors’ ability to keep information about their trusts
confidential.50 Proponents of the UTC claim these criticisms are due to
misinterpretation of both the UTC and state creditors’ rights laws, the latter
of which vary significantly among the states.51
V. ADOPTION OF THE UTC IN NORTH DAKOTA
Prior to the adoption of the UTC, the North Dakota trust laws were
contained in North Dakota Century Code (N.D.C.C.) chapters 59-01
through 59-05.52 N.D.C.C. chapter 59-01 set out general provisions.53
Chapter 59-02 provided for trusts for the benefit of third persons,54 and
chapter 59-03 provided for trusts with relationship to realty.55 Chapter 5904 covered the administration of trusts.56 The Uniform Principal and
Income Act was codified in N.D.C.C. chapter 59-04.2.57 Finally, N.D.C.C.
chapter 59-05 addressed powers in relationship to real property.58 The
North Dakota statutes were not as comprehensive as the UTC.59
In a desire to update existing law, a bill was introduced before the
North Dakota Legislative Assembly in 2005, providing for the adoption of

47. Uniform Trust Code Introduced in 9 States, UTC NOTES (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs
on Unif. State Laws, Chicago, Ill.), Feb. 2002, at 1, available at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/
UTCNotes1Q02.pdf (“The Uniform Trust Code (“UTC”) was introduced by the following
legislatures in 2001 or 2002: District of Columbia, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, and West Virginia.”).
48. Danforth, supra note 44, at 2554.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2556.
51. Suzanne Brown Walsh et al., What is the Status of Creditors Under the Uniform Trust
Code?, 32 EST. PLAN. 29, 31 (Feb. 2005).
52. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 59-01 to 59-05 (repealed 2007).
53. Id. ch. 59-01.
54. Id. ch. 59-02.
55. Id. ch. 59-03.
56. Id. ch. 59-04.
57. Id. ch. 59-04.2.
58. Id. ch. 59-05.
59. N.D. LEGIS. COUNCIL, UNIFORM TRUST CODE, Judiciary Comm., 59th Sess., at 305
(2005), available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/59-2005/interim-info/final-reports/jufinal.
pdf.
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the UTC.60 The introduction of the bill was controversial, with representatives of the banking industry opposing the bill.61 A representative from the
North Dakota Bankers Association claimed, “[T]he UTC include[d] provisions that compromise [the] privacy of grantors, endanger[ed] estate plans,
and interfere[d] with special needs trusts which are established for disabled
persons.”62 Concern was also expressed about the retroactivity of the
provisions, and an implication was made the UTC had not been adequately
tested in other jurisdictions.63 The bill failed to pass the Senate because of
opposition by the North Dakota Bankers Association, the North Dakota
Credit Union League, and the State Bar Association of North Dakota.64 A
common refrain among the bill’s opponents was that North Dakota’s
existing laws were adequate and there was no need for change.65
Despite the failure of the bill, a resolution was introduced directing the
Legislative Council to study the desirability of later adoption.66 A task
force was formed to review the UTC as well as the modified versions
adopted by other states.67 The task force was formed by the State Bar
Association, with members selected based on their involvement with trusts,
including attorneys who draft trusts, trust company representatives, bank
representatives, and attorneys for government agencies.68 The interim judiciary committee received testimony from the task force, the ULC, the State
Bar Association, and the Bankers Association.69 By the time the interim
judiciary committee’s report and recommendations were issued, eighteen
states and the District of Columbia had adopted the UTC.70 Eight more

60. S.B. 2122, 59th Sess. (N.D. 2005).
61. Hearing on S.B. 2122 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 59th Sess. (N.D. 2005)
(statement of Marylin Foss, North Dakota Bankers Association, before the committee regarding
the organization’s opposition to the bill) [hereinafter Hearing on S.B. 2122]; see also id. (comments of Sen. Thomas L. Trenbeath, expressing disappointment that the Bankers Association and
the State Bar Association failed to support the bill despite the endorsement of the Uniform Law
Commission).
62. Id. (statement of Marylin Foss, North Dakota Bankers Association, before the committee
regarding the organization’s opposition to the bill).
63. Id. (statement of Malcolm H. Brown, attorney at law, expressing his opposition to the
bill).
64. N.D. BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM, supra note 22, at 1.
65. Hearing on S.B. 2122, supra note 61 (statement of Greg Tschider, North Dakota Credit
Union League, expressing the organization’s opposition to the bill).
66. S. Con. Res. 4031, 59th Sess. (N.D. 2005).
67. Uniform Trust Code Study, supra note 28.
68. Id.; see also Hearing on H.B. 1034 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 60th Sess.
(N.D. 2007) (excerpt from the final report of the Legislative Council’s Interim Judiciary Committee and comments of Rep. Lawrence R. Klemin) [hereinafter Hearing on H.B. 1034].
69. Hearing on H.B. 1034, supra note 68 (excerpt from the final report of the Legislative
Council’s Interim Judiciary Committee).
70. Id.
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states were considering adoption.71 The committee noted several states in
the region of North Dakota were considering adoption of the UTC, including South Dakota, Iowa, and Montana.72 The committee ultimately recommended adoption of the UTC, with the changes recommended by the task
force.73 North Dakota’s version of the UTC was passed by both the House
and Senate and signed into law on March 13, 2007.74
VI. NORTH DAKOTA’S UTC
While one of the primary goals of the adoption of the UTC was to
promote uniformity between jurisdictions, the drafters of the UTC have
acknowledged some modification may be necessary.75 UTC drafters indicated language that may be adopted in brackets.76 The North Dakota Legislature has tailored the UTC by both modifying the bracketed language and
by altering other sections of the UTC.77 The following discussion examines
many of those legislative choices.
A. GENERAL PROVISIONS AND DEFINITIONS
Article I of the UTC, adopted as N.D.C.C. chapter 59-09, sets the context for the UTC.78 In addition to providing definitions for terms used by
the UTC, this section expresses the fundamental nature of the UTC as a gap
filler.79 Generally, the terms of the specific trust, as drafted by the settler,
will prevail over the provisions of the UTC.80 The cases where the UTC
would override specific trust provisions are few and mostly unavoidable.
For example, the requirements for trust creation, good-faith requirements
for trustees, modification authority of courts, and jurisdiction requirements
are all unsurprising.81 These elements are, mostly, fundamental to the UTC
and must be in place for a uniform interpretation among states.82

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Measure Actions, N.D. LEGISLATIVE BRANCH, http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/602007/bill-actions/ba1034.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2010).
75. S. Alan Medlin, The Impact of Significant Substantive Provisions of the South Carolina
Trust Code, 57 S.C. L. REV. 137, 170 (Autumn 2005).
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-09-03(16), (19) (2007) (adding definitions).
78. See generally UNIF. TRUST CODE overview (2005) (describing the context of the UTC).
79. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-09-05.
80. Id.; UNIF. TRUST CODE overview (2005).
81. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-09-05.
82. See id.
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Interestingly, the North Dakota adoption of the UTC failed to include
several provisions in the article that relate to rights of beneficiaries.83
Section 105(b)(2) of the UTC requires “a trustee to act in good faith and in
accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the
beneficiaries.”84 The North Dakota adoption of the UTC eliminated the
provision regarding a mandatory duty of a trustee to act in accordance with
beneficiaries’ interests.85 Gone, too, are two optional bracketed subsections
that address beneficiary notice requirements.86 These modifications suggest
an attempt to place more weight on the purposes of the trust, and therefore
the settlor’s intent, than on the beneficiaries’ interests.
Also absent from the North Dakota adoption of Article I are the
references to “public policy.”87 Under the common law, both illegal trusts
and trusts deemed “contrary to public policy” were void.88 Trusts violating
public policy are those that “tend to induce the commission of unlawful or
immoral acts by beneficiaries or would create an improper motive tending
to induce conduct that is not in itself unlawful or immoral.”89 Trusts including “provisions that tend to undermine proper administration of trusts”
are also considered against public policy.90 The North Dakota Legislature
has chosen, perhaps wisely, to abandon such murky concepts in favor of
allowing settlors to form a trust for any purpose that is not expressly
unlawful.91
B. JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Article II of the UTC addresses a trust’s principal place of administration for trusts that span multiple jurisdictions.92 This section also provides
optional provisions addressing jurisdiction and venue. Section 203, which
83. See id.
84. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(2) (emphasis added).
85. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-09-05(2)(b).
86. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(8)-(9) (“The terms of a trust prevail over any provision of
this [Code] except: . . . [(8) the duty under Section 813(b)(2) and (3) to notify qualified beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust who have attained 25 years of age of the existence of the trust, of
the identity of the trustee, and of their right to request trustee’s reports;] [(9) the duty under
Section 813(a) to respond to the request of a [qualified] beneficiary of an irrevocable trust for
trustee’s reports and other information reasonably related to the administration of a trust;] . . . .”).
87. UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 105(b)(3), 107.
88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 (2003).
89. Id. gen. cmt. on cl. (b) and (c).
90. Id.
91. The existence of public policy exceptions to trust provisions make it possible for individuals to challenge the validity of a trust without the settlor of that trust having any notice of the
potential defect or having the opportunity to repair it. See Hecker v. Stark Cnty. Soc. Serv. Bd.,
527 N.W.2d 226, 234-37 (N.D. 1994).
92. UNIF. TRUST CODE overview (2005).
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grants jurisdiction to specific courts, is unnecessary in North Dakota because the state has no courts with specific jurisdiction to deal with trust
matters; the section was therefore omitted.93 The UTC section on venue,
however, was preserved.94
C. REPRESENTATION
One of the major gaps in the trust law of most states was guidance as it
pertained to representatives.95 North Dakota is a prime example, having
provided no guidance in this area.96 Article III addresses representation of
beneficiaries, including representation by fiduciaries, and introduces a concept known as virtual representation.97
A representative may serve on behalf of either the settlor or beneficiaries, and has the authority to receive notice and to give binding consent.98 This authority is limited, however, to representatives who have no
conflict of interest with those being represented.99 UTC section 303 addresses specific representational relationships, including guardian-ward and
agent-principal.100 Specific to North Dakota’s adoption of the UTC is the
particular guidance provided to parents acting in a representative capacity
for their minor or unborn children.101 While the UTC recognizes parents
may represent their children, the North Dakota adoption provides additional
guidance to be applied when parents seeking the same child disagree about
representative decisions.102
UTC section 304 provides for the practice of “virtual representation,”
where an individual with a substantially identical interest with respect to a
particular issue may represent a minor, an incapacitated or unborn person,
or someone who is unascertainable.103 This representative ability is, of
course, limited to issues where there is no conflict of interest.104 UTC
93. See N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
94. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-10-04 (2007).
95. UNIF. TRUST CODE art. III gen. cmt.
96. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 59-01 to -05, -07 (repealed 2007); id. ch. 59-04.1
(repealed 1999).
97. UNIF. TRUST CODE art. III gen. cmt.
98. Id. § 301.
99. Id. § 302.
100. Id. § 303.
101. Id. § 303(6).
102. A parent who is a beneficiary of the same trust as the child may represent the child. If
both parents, or neither parent, are beneficiaries of the trust, then the one who is the lineal descendant of the settlor may represent the child. If neither parent is a lineal descendant of the settlor nor
a beneficiary of the trust, then a guardian ad litem must be appointed. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-1103(6) (2007).
103. Id. § 59-11-04.
104. Id.
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section 305 provides for the appointment of a representative to handle nonjudicial settlements or to receive notice on behalf of the beneficiary.105 This
provision is intended to remedy concern over adequacy of representation in
nonjudicial settings.106 Ironically, this provision requires a court order to
effectuate a representative in nonjudicial circumstances, and thus has been
critiqued for being at odds with a fundamental cornerstone of the UTC:
keeping trust administration out of court.107
D. TRUST CREATION, VALIDITY, MODIFICATION, AND TERMINATION
The creation of trusts under the UTC essentially codifies the common
law for express trusts.108 However, the UTC also expressly allows the use
of trusts for purposes that were not allowed under the common law. The
UTC specifically allows settlors to create trusts for the benefit of animals.109 Under the common law, these trusts generally failed for lack of an
ascertainable beneficiary, although some courts would enforce such trusts
as “honorary trusts.”110 The UTC also specifically codifies honorary
trusts.111 Additionally, the Uniform Probate Code has been amended to
allow trusts for animals.112
The UTC provides three methods to create a trust: the transfer of
property to a trustee during the settlor’s lifetime or at death; declaration by
the settlor who is also the trustee that the property is being held in trust; or
the exercise of a power of appointment in favor of the trustee.113 Of these
methods, the oral declaration of trust can create the most difficulty because

105. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 305 cmt. (2006).
106. Martin D. Begleiter, Serve the Cheerleader—Serve the World: An Analysis of
Representation in Estate and Trust Proceedings and Under the Uniform Trust Code and Other
Modern Trust Codes, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 311, 347 n.159 (Summer 2008).
107. Id. at 349-50 n.174.
108. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 59-09-05 to -10.
109. Id. § 59-12-08.
110. In re Estate of Searight, 95 N.E.2d 779, 782 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950). Honorary trusts are
non-charitable trusts that fail as trusts because of a lack of an ascertainable beneficiary but are
allowed to exist because the trustee agrees to be bound by the trust’s terms. Id. At common law,
honorary trusts were typically limited to a twenty-one year existence because of the application of
the rule against perpetuities. Id. at 783.
111. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-12-09. These trusts overcome the primary concern caused by
the lack of an ascertainable beneficiary, the lack of a person with the power to enforce the trust, by
allowing either the settlor or a court to name someone who will have that power.
112. The ULC amended the Uniform Probate Code to allow for pet trusts in 1993. UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-907(c) (1993). North Dakota did not amend its version of the Uniform
Probate Code to include that provision.
113. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-12-01.
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of the lack of a written record.114 With the adoption of the UTC, North
Dakota repealed the existing law that allowed the creation of trusts for real
property by any acts or words on the part of the settlor that indicated with
certainty the intent to create a trust, the subject, purpose, and the beneficiary.115 While this statute allows oral declarations of trust generally, a
separate provision, one that is not a part of the UTC, imposes the obligation
that any trust relating to real property must be created or declared by a
written instrument subscribed by the trustee, by an instrument under which
the trustee claims the estate affected, or by operation of law.116
Perhaps the UTC’s most significant change from the common law is in
the area of trust modification. Under the common law, absent some reservation of the ability to modify a trust in the trust agreement,117 trusts could
only be amended if very specific circumstances existed.118 The difficulty in
trust modification exists to protect settlor intent. While the UTC still maintains consistency with the settlor’s intent as the most important aspect of
trust administration, it adds six specific provisions designed to enhance
flexibility.119
The first section allows modification or termination of a trust with the
consent of all the beneficiaries, so long as doing so is not inconsistent with
a material purpose of the trust.120 It is noteworthy that North Dakota did
not adopt optional section 411(c) of the UTC.121 This section would have
eliminated the presumption that spendthrift provisions are a material
purpose of the trust. It can fairly be concluded the existence of spendthrift
114. While the official comments to the UTC acknowledge the difficulties that can result
from oral declarations of trust, the comments only express a preference for more formal modes of
transfer.
115. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-01-04.
116. Id. § 59-12-14. This provision insures real estate trusts will be in compliance with the
statute of frauds.
117. Settlors could both reserve the right to amend a trust to themselves and to others. The
extent of the right to revise impacted the nature of the trust. An extensive right to amend may, for
example, make the trust revocable.
118. See In re Trust of Stuchell, 801 P.2d 852, 853-54 (Or. Ct. App. 1990). This should be
contrasted with the somewhat easier standard for amending a charitable trust under the doctrine of
cy pres. A charitable trust could be amended or terminated if its purposes became unlawful,
impracticable, or impossible to achieve. The UTC expands cy pres to allow the modification or
termination of charitable trusts that become wasteful. The lower standard for cy pres can be
explained by the fact the property in the trust will be applied in a manner consistent with the
settlor’s original intent, rather than reverting to the settlor.
119. UNIF. TRUST CODE art. IV cmt. (2006).
120. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-12-11(1). North Dakota did not adopt an optional provision
from UTC section 411(a) that would have allowed the modification or termination of a trust with
the consent of all the beneficiaries and the settler, even if the modification or termination is
inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust.
121. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411(c). North Dakota adopted sections 411(b), (d), and (e) of
the UTC as N.D.C.C. sections 59-12-11(1), (2), and (3).
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provisions in a trust will thus render the trust non-modifiable by consent
under North Dakota law. If a beneficiary is unable to consent, a court can
still allow the modification or termination if the non-consenting beneficiary’s interests are adequately protected.122 This provision represents a
codification of the Claflin doctrine.123 It should be contrasted with the law
in the United Kingdom that allows the modification of a trust whenever all
the beneficiaries agree, regardless of any material purpose of the settlor.124
The greatest broadening of the power of modification can be seen in
the UTC’s allowance of modification or termination because of unanticipated circumstances. “[T]he court may modify the administrative or dispositive terms of a trust or terminate the trust if, because of circumstances
not anticipated by the settlor, modification or termination will further the
purposes of the trust.”125 Prior North Dakota law only allowed a trust’s
termination when its object became impossible or unlawful.126 Modification of a trust was only allowed if the unanticipated circumstance “would
defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the
trust[;]” that is, one could not argue what the settlor would have done if
confronted with the new conditions.127
The UTC allows the modification or termination of trusts solely
because the “value of the trust property is insufficient to justify the cost of
administration.”128 If the value of the trust property is less than $100,000, a
trustee may terminate the trust after giving notice to the qualified beneficiaries and making an affirmative conclusion the value is insufficient to justify administration.129 Courts may not only terminate a trust, but can also
modify its terms or remove and replace the trustee if the court determines
the value of the trust property is insufficient.130 If either the trustee or the
court decides to terminate the trust, the trust property must be distributed in
a manner consistent with the purposes of the trust.131
Another significant deviation from the common law is the UTC’s
treatment of reformation to correct mistakes. Under the common law “plain
122. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-12-11(3).
123. See generally Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889) (holding a trust payable to a
beneficiary on attaining age thirty cannot be terminated prematurely because the age restriction on
termination was a valid limitation on the distribution of the assets).
124. See DUKEMINIER, SITKOFF & LINDGREN, supra note 6, at 641-42.
125. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-12-12(1).
126. Id. § 59-02-17 (repealed 2007).
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 167 (1959).
128. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-12-14.
129. Id. § 59-12-14(1).
130. Id. § 59-12-14(2). Courts may consider the economic viability of a trust regardless of
the value of the corpus.
131. Id. § 59-12-14(3).
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meaning rule,” testamentary trusts could not be amended to fix mistakes.132
The UTC removes any limitations on a court’s ability to hear evidence concerning mistakes, and the subsequent ability to fix any mistakes uncovered.133 The evidence as to the existence of the mistake and the true intent
of the settlor must be clear and convincing.134 The mistake of the settlor
may be one of either fact or law and may be in either the expression or the
inducement.135
One interesting provision of the UTC has no analog in prior common
or statutory law. Settlors often form trusts with the expectation state and
federal tax laws will continue to apply to the trust in roughly the same manner as they do when the trust is established. While changes in tax law are
often enacted with grandfather provisions that allow a trust to be amended
to comply with the new law,136 these provisions assume a process for
amending the trusts exists under state law. The UTC allows a court to
amend a trust to achieve the settlor’s tax objectives as long as the modifications are consistent with “the settlor’s probable intention[;]” in other
words, the court must determine what the settlor would have done if the
settlor were aware of the new tax laws.137 The court is even authorized to
give these changes retroactive effect.138
Finally, the UTC clarifies rules regarding the combination or division
of trusts.139 After notifying the beneficiaries, the trustee may combine
trusts or divide trusts unless doing so will “impair the rights of any beneficiary or adversely affect achievement of the purposes of the trust.”140 The
trustee can determine the terms of the resulting trusts with some flexibility
to alter the terms as long as the rights of the beneficiaries are substantially
the same.141 The UTC does not address the question of whether a trust with
132. LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 12-8 (4th ed. 2006).
Under the plain meaning rule, if the words of a trust agreement have a plain meaning, a court
cannot consider evidence that the settlor intended something other than the plain meaning.
133. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-12-15.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. 26.1601-1(b). The generation-skipping tax does “not apply to any
generation[-]skipping transfer under a trust . . . that was irrevocable on September 25, 1985.” The
Treasury enacted additional regulations outlining the extent to which irrevocable trusts could be
modified without being considered a new trust that would be subject to the generation-skipping
tax. Treas. Reg. 26.2601-1(b)(4).
137. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-12-16.
138. Id.
139. Id. § 59-12-17.
140. Id.
141. This means divided trusts do not have to have the same terms as one another or the
original trust if the beneficiaries have different rights under that trust. The trustee must also determine a single set of terms to govern a combined trust that will fairly represent the interests of the
beneficiaries under the trusts being combined.
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a value in excess of $100,000 could be divided into two trusts with lesser
values, thus allowing the trustee to terminate those trusts if it determines the
value of the trust property does not justify the cost of administration.142
Some have speculated such an action would be impermissible if part of a
plan for the early termination of a trust.143
E. CHARITABLE TRUSTS
While charitable trusts are generally required to meet the same requirements as any other trust, the UTC does contain some provisions that apply
specifically to charitable trusts. As under the common law, a charitable
trust need not have an ascertainable beneficiary under the UTC.144 The
UTC allows enforcement of a charitable trust by the settlor and the attorney
general, “among others.”145 The granting of this right to the settlor is a
change from the common law.146 The extent the “among others” language
allows others to enforce the terms of a charitable trust is not as clear; the
official comment only refers to people with “special interests.”147 Under
the common law, the number of people with a special interest was quite
limited.148 The courts in some states, however, have been broadening the
definition of special interest to allow individuals, other than the attorney
general or those with directly affected interests, to enforce charitable
trusts.149
The UTC codifies and broadens the application of cy pres to charitable
trusts.150 While the common law ability is retained to reform charitable

142. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-12-14. See supra text accompanying note 130.
143. Alan Newman, The Uniform Trust Code: An Analysis of Ohio’s Version, 34 N.U.L.
REV. 135, 159-60 n.154 (2008) (citing UNIF. TRUST CODE § 414 cmt. (2006)).
144. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-12-02(1). If a charitable trust designates a charitable organization as eligible to receive distributions, that organization has the rights of a qualified beneficiary
under the UTC, including the right to enforce the terms of the trust. Id. § 59-09-10.
145. Id. § 59-12-05(3).
146. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959).
147. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405 cmt. (2006).
148. See MARK L. ASCHER ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 37.3.10, at 2441 (5th
ed. 2008) (identifying persons “entitled to benefits under the trust that are greater than or different
from those to which members of the public are entitled generally;” for example, the current minister of a church that is the designated beneficiary of a charitable trust has standing to enforce that
trust). Further, the Second Restatement of Trusts states:
A suit can be maintained for the enforcement of a charitable trust by the Attorney
General or other public officer, or by a co-trustee, or by a person who has a special
interest in the enforcement of the charitable trust, but not by persons who have no
special interest or by the settlor or his heirs, personal representatives or next of kin.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959).
149. Smithers v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 723 N.Y.S.2d 426, 426 (App. Div. 2001).
150. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-12-13.
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trusts that become unlawful, impracticable, or impossible,151 the UTC also
allows cy pres when a charitable trust is merely wasteful.152 Perhaps more
importantly, the UTC also modifies the common law with regard to intent.
Cy pres, as applied in most jurisdictions, only allowed a court to modify the
terms of a charitable trust if the court found the beneficiary had a general
charitable intent.153 The UTC now presumes the settlor had a general charitable intent, thus allowing the court to reform the terms of the charitable
trust. While a charitable trust that is unlawful, impracticable, impossible, or
wasteful might still fail if the settlor had only a specific charitable intent,
the burden falls on the party opposing reformation to establish that fact.154
A provision in the charitable trust that provides for the distribution of property to a non-charitable trust beneficiary denies a court the power to apply
cy pres to the trust.155
F.

THE RIGHTS OF CREDITORS OF TRUST BENEFICIARIES

The provisions dealing with the right of trust beneficiary creditors to
pursue trust assets caused the most debate for the ULC.156 The drafting
committee made several choices regarding the rights of creditors that conflict with the policy choices made by some states.157
1.

Spendthrift Trusts

The common law has long recognized the validity of spendthrift trusts,
and the UTC does not change their general validity.158 Creation of a spendthrift trust requires an affirmative act on the part of the settlor, but the
settlor need only say the interest of the beneficiary is “held subject to a
‘spendthrift’ trust, or word of similar import” to be effective.159 The UTC
specifically provides creditors or assignees may not reach the interest of a
beneficiary of a spendthrift trust.160 Creditors or assignees may, however,
151. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003).
152. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-12-13(1).
153. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959).
154. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413 cmt. (2005).
155. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-12-13(2).
156. English, supra note 39, at 180.
157. See English, supra note 39, at 181-82. For example, the UTC specifically prohibits a
settlor from retaining an interest in a spendthrift trust, while Alaska, Delaware, Rhode Island, and
Nevada all allow for that possibility. Id. at 182 n.175.
158. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-13-02; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 (2003).
159. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-13-02(2). While the UTC retains the common law requirement
that spendthrift trusts had to restrain both voluntary and involuntary transfers, the trust need only
identify itself as a spendthrift trust to both attain spendthrift status and to impose voluntary and
involuntary restrictions.
160. Id. § 59-13-02(3).
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reach the interests of beneficiaries of trusts that do not contain a spendthrift
provision.161 After distribution of trust assets to the beneficiary, the trust
assets become subject to attachment like any other property held by the
beneficiary.162
The UTC limits a trustee’s ability to restrict mandatory distributions to
frustrate the creditor’s ability to reach assets in the hands of the beneficiary.163 If a trustee must make distributions to a beneficiary, but fails to do
so, a creditor may reach those distributions while still in the hands of the
trustee.164 It should be noted a mandatory distribution subject to a discretionary standard would not be considered mandatory for these purposes.165
The only limitation is the creditor must wait until a reasonable time has
passed since the designated distribution date.166
The UTC contains exceptions to the enforcement of spendthrift provisions. The largest of these exceptions may be claims due on a judgment or
court order for support or maintenance by a child, spouse, or former
spouse.167 This limitation, however, only puts the claimants in the same
position they would be in as creditors of a non-spendthrift trust—that is,
while they can attach to present or future distributions, they must wait until
such distributions are made.168 However, unlike general creditors, spouses
and children have standing to force trustees to make a distribution if they
have “not complied with a standard of distribution or have abused their
discretion.”169
While theoretically applying to others, the most likely persons to benefit from the inability to enforce a spendthrift trust are those “who provided
services for the protection of a beneficiary’s interest in the trust[,]” or the
beneficiary’s attorney.170 The drafting committee justifies this exception as
being necessary to allow “a beneficiary of modest means to overcome an
obstacle preventing the beneficiary’s obtaining services essential to the

161. Id. § 59-13-01.
162. Id. § 59-13-02 (prohibiting attachment of assets “before its receipt by the beneficiary”).
163. Id. § 59-13-06.
164. A mandatory distribution is one the trustee is required to make and excludes any distribution that is subject to an exercise of the trustee’s discretion. Id. § 59-13-06.
165. For example, a trustee may be obligated to make distributions when he or she determines such a distribution is necessary for a beneficiary’s health, education, support, and maintenance. Despite the fact the beneficiary would have the right to force such a distribution, it would
not be treated as mandatory for purposes of a creditor’s rights. Newman, supra note 143, at 164.
166. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-13-07. The UTC does not provide any standard for reasonable
time.
167. Id. § 59-13-03(2)(a).
168. Id. § 59-13-03(4); see discussion supra Part VI.F.2.
169. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-13-04.
170. Id. § 59-13-2(b).
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protection or enforcement of the beneficiary’s rights under the trust.”171
Unlike family creditors, however, the person who provides services does
not have the ability to compel a distribution that is subject to a trustee’s
discretion.172
The UTC excludes governmental claims from spendthrift provisions as
well.173 Exceptions for claims by state or federal governments are not surprising. Moreover, claims by the federal government cannot be barred under state law.174 Under the preemption doctrine, federal law, not state law,
determines the extent to which a spendthrift clause can limit claims of the
United States.175 The exception for claims by the states merely ensures if a
state statute allows for claims against spendthrift trusts, the general provisions of the UTC enforcement spendthrift provisions will not render those
statutes unenforceable. Absent some specific allowance in a state statute,
however, claims by a state are barred.176
2.

Non-Spendthrift Trusts

Trusts that do not contain spendthrift provisions may be wholly
mandatory, wholly discretionary, or some combination of the two. The
ability of creditors to reach the interest of a beneficiary depends on the existence and nature of trustee discretion. If a trust is wholly mandatory, a
court may “authorize a creditor or assignee of the beneficiary to reach the
beneficiary’s interest by attachment of present or future distributions . . . .”177 The court may limit the award as is appropriate under the
circumstances.178 As discussed below, the UTC authorizes the creditor to
pursue the trustee directly if a mandatory distribution has not been made
within a reasonable time after the designated time for distribution has
passed.179 Mandatory distributions are narrowly defined. Only distributions a trustee is required to make, including distributions on termination of
the trust, are included.180 Distributions that are subject to a standard of
171. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503 cmt. (2005) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 59 cmt. d (2003)).
172. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-13-04(2).
173. Id. § 59-13-03(2)(c).
174. ASCHER ET AL., supra note 148, § 15.5.4.
175. While the federal government is not subject to state law regarding the application of
spendthrift provisions, state property law may actually defeat a claim of the United States if the
beneficiary of a spendthrift trust is not deemed to have any “property rights” to which a federal
claim can attach. See United States v. O’Shaughnessy, 517 N.W.2d 574, 577 (Minn. 1994).
176. Newman, supra note 143, at 165.
177. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-13-01.
178. Id.
179. Id. § 59-13-06(2).
180. Id.§ 59-13-06(1).
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distribution, even if the beneficiary could require the trustee to make the
distribution, are not covered.181
While the general language allowing the attachment of a present or
future interest equally applies to a wholly discretionary trust, the creditor is
unable to actually enforce the attachment unless the trustee decides to make
a distribution.182 The creditor is generally prohibited from stepping into the
shoes of the beneficiary to force a distribution.183 This limitation can even
apply to claims against a trust where the trustee is also a beneficiary.184 The
drafters of the UTC were mindful that many estate planning trusts provide
for distributions from principal for the benefit of a surviving spouse. Under
federal estate tax law, such distributions must be subject to an ascertainable
standard to avoid inclusion of the entire trust principal in the surviving
spouse’s estate.185 Surviving spouses also typically serve as trustees of
these trusts. In order to avoid inadvertently exposing all of the principal of
such a trust to the claims of creditors, the drafters decided the fact that the
surviving spouse was the trustee should not be a factor in determining
whether the assets should be exposed to creditors.186 Thus, if a distribution
by a trustee to herself is subject to an ascertainable standard, creditors will
only be able to reach the distribution if they could reach it were the trustee
not a beneficiary.187 The UTC does not take a position on whether distributions not subject to an ascertainable standard from trustees to themselves
should receive the same protection.188 Some trusts can have both mandatory and discretionary provisions, like mandatory distributions of income
with discretionary distributions of principal subject to an ascertainable standard. Courts should apply the rules appropriate to the type of distribution
the creditor wishes to attach.

181. Id.
182. See id. § 59-13-01.
183. “[A] creditor of a beneficiary may not compel a distribution that is subject to the trustee’s discretion, even if the discretion is expressed in the form of a standard of distribution, or the
trustee has abused the discretion.” Id. § 59-13-04(2). See also id. § 59-13-04(3) (discussing the
exception that applies to claims made by children, spouses, and former spouses of the
beneficiary).
184. Id. § 59-13-04(5).
185. The power to invade the corpus for the benefit of the spouse that is “limited by an ascertainable standard relating to the health, education, support or maintenance” of the spouse is not
considered a power of appointment that must be included in the spouse’s estate. I.R.C.
§ 2041(b)(1)(A) (West 2010).
186. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504 cmt. (2005).
187. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-13-04(5).
188. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 cmt. g (2003) (explaining the beneficial interest of a beneficiary/trustee may be reached by the beneficiary/trustee’s creditors).
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Claims Against the Settlor

Creditors of a settlor also have a limited ability to pursue a trust’s
assets while the settlor is alive.189 If the trust is a revocable trust, the property in the trust can be subject to the claims of the settlor’s creditors to the
extent the property will be subject to those claims had it not been in trust.190
If the trust is irrevocable, a creditor can only reach the amount of the trust
that could be distributed for the settlor’s benefit.191 Thus, creditors can only
reach an irrevocable trust if the settlor is also a beneficiary. When the settlor is also a beneficiary, the creditor can reach the full amount that could be
distributed. This means the settlor/beneficiary does not receive any of the
benefits a non-settlor/beneficiary receives when distributions are subject to
trustee discretion.192
The rights of creditors to pursue trust assets continue after the settlor
dies if the settlor could revoke the trust.193 The exposure is not only to
creditors of the settlor, but to the costs of estate administration, the
expenses of the settlor’s funeral and remains disposal, and the statutory
allowances for the spouse and the children to the extent the probate estate is
insufficient.194 The UTC treats individuals with the power to withdraw
property from a trust as if they were settlors of revocable trusts, at least to
the extent of the power.195 If the holder of the power allows it to lapse,
releases, or waives it, the person will only be treated as a settlor to the
extent the power exceeds the greater of five percent of the trust’s value or
$10,000.196
G. REVOCABLE TRUSTS
The common law of trust developed when revocable trusts served, at
best, as supplemental to passing estates by will. As revocable trusts have
taken an ever greater role in supplanting wills as the mechanism for
189. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-13-05.
190. Id. § 59-13-05(1).
191. Id.
192. Id. If the trust should have more than one settlor, the amount that can be reached cannot
exceed the portion of the trust attributable to the particular settlor whose claims are being
satisfied. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. The statute providing for spouses and children can be found in N.D.C.C. title 30.1,
North Dakota’s adoption of the Uniform Probate Code, and in chapter 47-18, the homestead
exception.
195. Id. § 59-13-05(2).
196. Id. The limitations come from the Internal Revenue Code sections 2041(b)(2) and
2514(e), which define the five and five power—the release of a power of appointment is only
treated as a gift to the extent it exceeds five percent of the value of the trust or $5,000—and
section 2503(b), which identifies the annual exclusion gifts.
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transferring property at death, the common law of trusts often failed to help
trusts fill the will substitute role. The UTC, in recognition of this fact,
adopts numerous rules dealing specifically with revocable trusts.197 The
UTC incorporated the mental capacity requirements for wills for the creation of revocable trusts.198 This should be contrasted with the requirement
to make a non-revocable trust, where the settlor need only have the “capacity to create a trust.”199 The UTC also incorporates the will concepts of
fraud, duress, and undue influence, although these concepts apply to all
trusts.200 Those who wish to contest the validity of a revocable trust must
do so by the earlier of three years after the death of the settlor or 120 days
after the trustee notified the person of the trust’s existence.201 Although not
perfectly clear from the statutory language, notice may not be given until
the death of the settler because the revocability of the trust at the death of
the settler cannot be known until then. Those who will use revocable trusts
as a will substitute and wish to protect against the possibility of challenges
being mounted after the settlor dies would be well advised to bring an
action for ante-mortem probate of a pour-over will under North Dakota
law.202
Prior North Dakota law presumed irrevocability of trusts.203 All trusts
created after August 1, 2007, are presumed to be revocable absent an
express statement in the trust that it be irrevocable.204 A settlor who has

197. N.D.C.C. chapter 59-14 contains rules that apply exclusively to revocable trusts, while
other sections of the UTC have provisions that apply different rules to revocable trusts. E.g., id.
§ 59-13-05(1) (allowing creditors of the estate of the settlor of a revocable trust to reach all of the
trust assets, while no similar right is granted to the creditors of the estate of a settlor of an irrevocable trust).
198. “The capacity required to create, amend, revoke, or add property to a revocable trust, or
to direct the actions of the trustee of a revocable trust, is the same as that required to make a will.”
Id. § 59-14-01.
199. Id. § 59-12-02(1). The capacity to make an irrevocable trust is the same as the capacity
one must have to make a gift of property. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402 cmt (2005).
200. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-12-06.
201. Id. § 59-14-04(1). The notice must also include a copy of the trust instrument, the
trustee’s name and address, and notice of the time allowed for commencing a proceeding.
202. Id. ch. 30.1-08.1. The probate process allows a testator to institute an action for a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of the will as to the testamentary capacity and freedom
from undue influence of the testator. Id. The declaratory judgment can also speak to the validity
of the signature on the will and the required number of witnesses and their signatures. While the
provision does not apply to trusts, a court ruling on the validity of a pour-over will signed at the
same time as a trust agreement should provide more than ample evidence of a settlor’s capacity to
make a trust.
203. Id. § 59-02-18 (repealed 2007).
204. Id. § 59-14-02(1). The effective date protects settlors who created trusts prior to the
adoption of the UTC, with the intention the trusts be irrevocable, and who relied on the prior law,
that such irrevocability need not be expressly stated. The drafting committee expects the provision to have limited impact because “professional drafters habitually spell out whether or not a
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retained the power to revoke is also presumed to have retained the power to
amend that trust.205 Because that settlor could have revoked the trust and
then created a new trust with amended terms, this is not much of an extension of the settlor’s power. Amendment or revocation of a revocable trust
requires the settlor to substantially comply with any method provided by the
trust for that action.206 If the trust does not provide for a method, or provides for a nonexclusive method, the settlor may use any method “manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the settlor’s intent.”207 This includes
the ability to amend the trust by a later executed will or codicil that expressly refers to the trust.208
The power to amend or revoke a revocable trust is personal to the settlor, but the UTC clarifies when that power may be exercised by someone
else on behalf of the settlor. An agent may act on behalf of the settlor, but
only if the power to amend, revoke, or distribute trust property has been expressly granted to the agent under the trust or the power.209 If the settlor’s
capacity has become the subject of legal action, the powers to amend,
revoke, or distribute trust property can be exercised by the appointed conservator, or if no conservator has been appointed, by the settlor’s guardian,
but “only with the approval of the court supervising the conservatorship or
guardianship.”210
The UTC makes considerable changes to the general rules of trusts
dealing with the relationship between the trustee and the beneficiaries.
While trustees generally owe a duty of impartiality that requires trustees to
give “due regard” to the respective interests of multiple beneficiaries,211
during the time a trust is revocable, “rights of the beneficiaries are subject
to the control of, and the duties of the trustee are owed exclusively to, the
settlor.”212 This is true even if the settlor is incapacitated. While others
trust is revocable.” UNIF. TRUST CODE § 602 cmt. The provision may have more impact with
trusts established by people without the help of professionals.
205. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 601 cmt.
206. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-14-02(3).
207. Id.
208. Id. This is a change from the common law, where changes to a revocable trust could
not be effectuated by a will unless the settlor specifically reserved the power to do so. See
Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. First Nat’l Bank, 262 N.W.2d 403, 405 (Minn. 1977);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 330 cmt. j (1959).
209. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-14-02(5).
210. Id. § 59-14-02(6).
211. Id. § 59-16-03. The most difficult aspect of this duty is the ability to balance the interests of the income and remainder beneficiaries.
212. Id. § 59-14-03(1). The drafters of the UTC provided states with the included option to
limit the exclusivity to the time when the settlor has the capacity to revoke the trust. The expressed justification was this would allow beneficiaries to “request information concerning the
trust” and receive other reports and information from the trustee. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603 cmt.
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have suggested this is a problem that should be rectified by granting other
beneficiaries the right to receive and enforce the duties,213 this concern
seems overstated. Any beneficiary who suspects a trustee has failed to fulfill its duties to an incapacitated settlor can petition a court to appoint a
conservator for that settlor, providing a person who can enforce the trust.
Even if a court feels a conservator is unnecessary, it can appoint a person to
represent the settlor’s interests.214
H. THE TRUSTEE
The provisions of the UTC concerning trustees can be roughly divided
into three groups: those concerning the office generally; those concerning
the duties and powers of the trustee; and those dealing with trustee
liability.215
1.

The Office of Trustee

N.D.C.C. chapter 59-15 contains the general rules concerning the
office of the trustee. However, these default rules can generally be changed
by the terms of the trust.216 A person does not become a trustee until he or
she accepts the position. The terms of the trust may provide for an exclusive method of acceptance, and the position is accepted by substantially
complying with that method.217 If the trust does not provide an exclusive
method for acceptance, a person may accept the trusteeship by “accepting
delivery of the trust property, exercising power or performing duties as
trustee, or otherwise indicating acceptance of the trusteeship.”218 A person
may decline the trusteeship anytime before acceptance.219 However, if a
designated person does not accept the proffered trusteeship within a reasonThe North Dakota Legislature decided to exclude the bracketed language and maintain the
trustee’s duties as being owed solely to the settlor while the trust is revocable.
213. Newman, supra note 143, at 177-78.
214. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-11-05. While this section is designed to deal with the problems associated with minor and unascertained beneficiaries, the language allows its application
anytime a “court determines that an interest is not represented under this chapter, or that the otherwise available representation might be inadequate[.]” Id. § 59-11-05(1).
215. The trustee is, of course, heavily impacted by other provisions of the N.D.C.C. For example, the Uniform Principal and Income Act and the Uniform Probate Code both contain numerous provisions that impact the duties that apply to trustees.
216. Id. The settlor may not alter the power of a court to require, dispense with, modify, or
terminate a bond, or the ability of a court to adjust a trustee’s compensation. Id. § 59-09-05(2)(f)(g).
217. Id. § 59-15-01(1). Although not explicitly stated, any method of acceptance that does
not demonstrate the necessary intent on the part of the nominated person to accept the trusteeship
would not cause the person to be trustee. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 701 cmt.
218. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 701.
219. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-15-01(2). Once a person has accepted the trusteeship, the person may only leave the trusteeship by resigning under N.D.C.C. section 59-15-05.
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able time after knowing of the designation, the trusteeship is deemed declined.220 A designated person in possession of trust property may act to
preserve that property without being deemed to have accepted the position
as trustee.221 However, the designated person must provide notice to the
settlor that the designated person has declined the trusteeship.222
Should a trust have more than one trustee, the UTC allows trustees to
make decisions by majority vote.223 This is a change from the common law
presumption that multiple trustees must act by unanimous vote.224 The
UTC also provides clear rules regarding co-trustees who cannot, or choose
not to, perform certain trustee functions. The general rule is that all trustees
must participate in the performance of a trustee function.225 A trustee who
is unable to perform the function because of absence, illness, disqualification under another law, or some other temporary incapacity need not perform the trustee’s function.226 A trustee also need not participate in the performance of a function if the function has been properly delegated.227 The
drafters prohibited a trustee from delegating any “function the settlor
reasonably expected the trustees to perform jointly.”228 The North Dakota
Legislature allowed a trustee to delegate any function “other than a function
that the terms of the trust expressly require to be performed by the trustees
jointly.”229 This is a change from the common law, which provided certain
core functions could never be delegated.230

220. Id. § 59-15-01(2). The drafters intended this provision to protect the trust from the inaction that can result if a designated trustee neither accepts nor declines within a reasonable time.
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 701 cmt.
221. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-15-01(3). In addition to preserving the trust property, the designated person has the specifically provided power to inspect or investigate the trust property to
determine potential liability under “environmental or other law or for any other purpose.” Id.
222. Id. If the settlor is no longer living or otherwise lacks capacity, the designated person
must provide the notice of declination to a qualified beneficiary of the trust.
223. Id. § 59-15-03(1).
224. See DUKEMINIER, SITKOFF & LINDGREN, supra note 6, at 687.
225. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-15-03(3).
226. Id. The UTC also allows the other co-trustees to act whenever one of their number is
unable to perform because of absence, illness, disqualification under other law, or other temporary
capacity if “prompt action is necessary to achieve the purposes of the trust or to avoid injury to the
trust property.” Id. § 59-15-03(4).
227. Id. § 59-15-03(3). This section deals solely with delegation to another trustee. Trustees
who wish to delegate duties and powers to a non-trustee must do so in compliance with N.D.C.C.
section 59-16-07.
228. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 703(e) (2005).
229. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-15-03(5).
230. “A traditional rule of trust fiduciary law is that trustees may not delegate to others those
responsibilities that they can reasonably be required to perform themselves.” WAGGONER ET AL.,
supra note 132, at 20-42.
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Trustees who do not participate in an action of the trustees are not liable for that action.231 However, a trustee that delegates or is otherwise unable to participate in trustee action still must “exercise reasonable care to
prevent a co-trustee from committing a serious breach of trust.”232 When
the actions of the trustees require the participation of a trustee who dissented from that action, the trustee may participate in that action without
liability so long as the action is not a serious breach of trust.233
The provisions of the UTC governing the appointment of successor
trustees are fairly straightforward. A vacancy can occur because the existing trustee declines, cannot be located, cannot be identified, does not exist,
resigns, is disqualified or removed, dies, or has a guardian appointed.234 If
co-trustees remain, replacement of a trustee is not required.235 The UTC
gives courts the ability to appoint an additional trustee or special fiduciary
whenever it considers such an appointment necessary, regardless of whether
the trust has a vacancy.236 If a vacancy must be filled, the successor will be
named from a priority list. First, the person designated by the terms of the
trust to act as successor trustee will be named.237 Second, for a noncharitable trust, a person may be appointed by unanimous agreement of qualified
beneficiaries.238 For a charitable trust, the position must be filled by someone expressly designated by the charity to receive distributions, with the
concurrence of the Attorney General.239 For both charitable and noncharitable trusts, the failure to name a trustee under the first two methods leaves
the appointment of a successor trustee to the court.240

231. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-15-03(6).
232. Id. § 59-15-03(7). This includes an obligation to compel the co-trustees to redress a
serious breach of trust that has already been committed.
233. Id. § 59-15-03(8).
234. Id. § 59-15-04(1). Consistent with common law, the fact an initially designated trustee
declines the office does mean that the trust fails. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 701 cmt. (2005) (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 35 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999)).
235. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-15-04(2).
236. Id. § 59-15-04(5). Note, however, this provision is not specifically identified under
N.D.C.C. section 59-09-05 as one that cannot be overridden by the terms of the trust. Any court
finding such an appointment would be necessary for the administration of the trust, however,
would likely find the authority to do so under N.D.C.C. section 59-09-05(2)(k), which prevents a
trust agreement from inhibiting a court’s ability “to take such action and exercise such jurisdiction
as may be necessary in the interests of justice[.]” Id. § 59-09-05(2)(k).
237. Id. § 59-15-04(3)-(4).
238. Id. § 59-15-04(3).
239. Id. § 59-15-04(4). The section does not require the appointment by the charitable
organization to be unanimous. While the Attorney General has the rights of a qualified beneficiary with respect to a charitable trust under N.D.C.C. section 59-09-10(3), the Attorney General
would not be covered by the language of “charitable organizations expressly designated to receive
distributions.” Id. § 59-09-10(1).
240. Id. § 59-15-05(4).
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Trustees, as fiduciaries, face limitations on their ability to resign.
Under the UTC, the trustee must give at least thirty days notice to: the
settlor, if living; all co-trustees; and all qualified beneficiaries.241 The trustee may also seek to resign with court approval.242 The resignation of the
trustee has no impact on the potential liability of a trustee for any acts or
omissions, other than to start the running of the statute of limitations for
such an action.243
While the settlor can retain or grant the power to remove a trustee,244
the UTC provides specific guidance for removal of a trustee by the
courts.245 Three findings that justify a trustee removal are:
[I]f the trustee has committed a serious breach of trust; if lack of
cooperation among co-trustees substantially impairs the administration of the trust; if because of unfitness, unwillingness, or persistent failure of the trustee to administer the trust effectively, . . .
removal of the trustee best serves the interest of the beneficiaries . . . .246
These findings are consistent with the common law limitation that
trustees could only be removed for cause.247 A significant change from the
common law under the UTC is to allow the removal of a trustee upon a
substantial change of circumstances or upon the request of all the qualified
beneficiaries.248 The court need only find that removal serves the interests
of all the beneficiaries, is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the
trust, and a suitable successor is available.249 Regardless of why a trustee

241. Id. § 59-15-05(1)(a). In keeping with the general rule, the trustees of revocable trusts
only owe duties to the settlor under N.D.C.C. section 59-16-13(1); the resigning trustee need not
provide notice to any qualified beneficiaries of a revocable trust.
242. Id. § 59-15-05(1)(b). The court, in approving the resignation, may impose any conditions it determines reasonably necessary for the protection of the trust property. Id. § 59-15-05(2).
243. Id. § 59-15-05(3). Under N.D.C.C. section 59-18-05(3), a judicial proceeding for
breach of trust must be commenced within five years of a trustee’s resignation. The period can be
shortened if the beneficiary is provided with a report that adequately discloses the potential claim
for breach of trust. Id. § 59-18-05(1)-(2). See discussion supra note 295 and accompanying text.
244. A person other than the settlor who has the power to remove a trustee, commonly referred to as a trust protector, while not possessing the same duties and obligations as a trustee, is still
presumed to be “a fiduciary who, as such, is required to act in good faith with regard to the
purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-16-08(4).
245. N.D.C.C. section 59-15-06 allows a court to remove a trustee on a request by the settlor,
a co-trustee, a beneficiary, or on its own initiative.
246. Id. § 59-15-06(2).
247. ASCHER ET AL., supra note 148, § 11.10, at 654.
248. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-15-06(2). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 37, 37 cmt.
(2003).
249. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-15-06(2).
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removal is contemplated, the court may order relief in addition to or in lieu
of removing the trustee.250
2.

Trustee’s Duties and Powers

The UTC generally carries forward the common law duties of trustees.
The trustee must “administer the trust in good faith,”251 must exercise the
“reasonable care, skill, and caution” of a “prudent person,”252 and must generally care for the trust property.253 Perhaps the most significant change in
the area of trustee duties is the formal codification of the duties of loyalty
and impartiality.254 The duty of loyalty requires the trustee to “administer
the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries.”255 The UTC now
places numerous presumptions on transactions by the trustee with the trust
or beneficiaries. Any “sale, encumbrance, or other transaction involving
the investment or management of trust property” on the trustee’s own
account or that is “otherwise affected by a conflict between the trustee’s
fiduciary and personal interests is voidable by a beneficiary.”256 This is a
codification of the no further inquiry rule: any transaction between the trust
and the trustee is voidable without the need for any further proof.257 The
only transactions that avoid this treatment are those authorized by the trust,
approved by a court, consented to by the beneficiary, or involving a
contract entered into before the trustee became or contemplated becoming
trustee.258 Transactions are presumed to be in conflict with the fiduciary
interests of the trustee if the transaction is between the trust and: the
trustee’s spouse, descendants, siblings, parents, or their spouses; an agent or

250. Id. § 59-15-06(3). The relief may be awarded even while the removal is still being considered by the court. The nature of the possible relief is defined under N.D.C.C. section 59-1801(2) and includes a broad range of financial and other remedies. See infra note 292.
251. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-16-01.
252. Id. § 59-16-04.
253. This includes: taking “reasonable steps to take control of and protect the trust property,” id. § 59-16-09; keeping “adequate records” to avoid intermingling of trustee property with
trust property, id. § 59-16-10; taking “reasonable steps to enforce claims of the trust and to defend
claims against the trust,” id. § 59-16-11; and collecting the trust property from former trustees or
other persons, id. § 59-16-12.
254. Both of these duties have long been recognized under the common law. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 78-79 (2003).
255. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-16-02.
256. Id. § 59-16-02(2).
257. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802 cmt. (2005).
258. Id. A beneficiary may only consent to, ratify, or release a trustee from liability for an
action if the beneficiary knew the material facts relating to the transaction. N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 59-18-09.
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attorney of the trustee; or an entity or enterprise in which the trustee has an
interest that might affect the trustee’s best judgment.259
Even if a transaction does not involve trust property, a transaction
between the trustee and a beneficiary is voidable by the beneficiary if the
transaction was entered into “during the existence of the trust or while the
trustee retain[ed] significant influence over the beneficiary.”260 Unlike the
transactions involving trust property, however, the trustee is able to prove
the transaction was fair to the beneficiary and render the deal enforceable.261 The UTC also codifies the opportunity doctrine, which defines a
transaction as representing a conflict between the trustee’s personal and
fiduciary interests if the transaction involved an opportunity that properly
belonged to the trust.262
The duty of loyalty provides provisions that deal directly with the
ownership and management of trust property. Trustees are specifically authorized to invest in companies or trusts to which the trustee provides
services in a capacity other than as trustee.263 The trustee is even authorized to receive compensation from the company or trust out of the fees
charged to the trust for the investment, although the trustee must notify the
qualified beneficiaries of the rate and method for determining that compensation.264 In exercising voting or other control rights over any investment
or other business interests, the trustee must act in the best interests of the
beneficiaries.265
The UTC approves, at least if they are fair to the beneficiaries, several
transactions that could run afoul of the no further inquiry rule of the duty of
loyalty.266 Such transactions concern agreements between the trustee and
the beneficiary related to compensation, transactions between the trust and
other entities to which the trustee owes a fiduciary duty, and some advances
of money to trust by the trustee.267 Neither the UTC nor its comments,

259. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-16-02(3). For institutional trustees, transactions between the
trust and someone who has a significant interest in the trustee also raises the presumption.
260. Id. § 59-16-02(4).
261. Id.
262. Id. § 59-16-02(5). The comment to UTC section 802 notes this section allows the
beneficiary to void a transaction involving a trust opportunity. The language of the section does
not create that voidability directly, but does so because such a transaction involves the “investment” of trust property, bringing the transaction under N.D.C.C. section 59-16-02(2).
263. Id. § 59-16-02(6). More precisely, such an investment is not presumed to present a conflict between the personal and fiduciary interests of the trustee as long as the investment complies
with the prudent investor rule of N.D.C.C. chapter 59-17.
264. Id. §§ 59-16-02(6),-13.
265. Id. § 59-16-02(7).
266. Id. § 59-16-02(8).
267. Id. This section does not preclude the following transactions, if fair to the beneficiaries:
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however, provide any indication as to whether the burden is on the trustee
to prove the transactions are fair to the beneficiary.268
The duty of impartiality requires the trustee “to act impartially in
investing, managing, and distributing the trust property, giving due regard
to the beneficiaries’ respective interests.”269 The common law duty of impartiality developed as an aspect of the duty of loyalty.270 Impartiality
“does not mean that the trustee must treat the beneficiaries equally.”271
Rather, the trustee must treat the beneficiaries equitably given the purposes
and terms of the trust. A settlor may, in fact, advise the trustee to generally
favor the interest of one beneficiary over those of another.272
The UTC authorizes the trustee to make certain delegations to nontrustees, and even encourages such delegation in some situations.273 Allowance of delegation removes some of the uncertainty regarding delegation
that existed under the common law and is consistent with the Uniform
Prudent Investor Act.274 The standard for any delegation of power is
whether a prudent trustee of comparable skill could properly delegate under
the same circumstances.275 The trustee must “exercise reasonable care,
skill, and caution” in selecting the agent, setting the terms of the delegation,
and monitoring the agent.276 Compliance with delegation rules means the
trustee will have no liability for the actions of the agent.277 Agents who
accept a delegation from a North Dakota trust owe a duty to the trust to
exercise reasonable care,278 and subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the
North Dakota courts.279

[A]n agreement between a trustee and a beneficiary relating to the appointment or
compensation of the trustee; payment of reasonable compensation to the trustee; a
transaction between a trust and another trust, decedent’s estate, or conservatorship of
which the trustee is a fiduciary or in which a beneficiary has an interest; a deposit of
trust money in a regulated financial-service institution operated by the trustee; or an
advance by the trustee of money for the protection of the trust . . . .
Id.
268. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.02(G)(2) (West 2006) (placing the burden on the
beneficiary).
269. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-16-03.
270. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 803 cmt. (“The duty of impartiality is an important aspect of
the duty of loyalty.”).
271. Id.
272. Id. For example, a person who wants a trustee to favor a surviving spouse over other
beneficiaries may so advise the trustee.
273. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 807 cmt.; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-16-07.
274. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 807 cmt.
275. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-16-07(1).
276. Id.
277. Id. § 59-16-07(3).
278. Id. § 59-16-07(2).
279. Id. § 59-16-07(4).
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Perhaps the most important change in the trustee’s duties under the
UTC concerns the obligation to provide information to the beneficiaries.
Under prior North Dakota law, trustees did not have to regularly provide
such information.280 Trustees were, however, always advised to make regular accountings to the beneficiaries in order to limit their liability.281 The
UTC requires the trustee to “keep the qualified beneficiaries of the trust reasonably informed about the administration of the trust and of the material
facts necessary for them to protect their interests.”282 If a beneficiary
requests information, the trustee must “promptly respond to [the] request”
as long as it is not “unreasonable under the circumstances.”283 Any quailfied beneficiary of a revocable trust or any beneficiary of a non-revocable
trust may request a copy of the trust instrument.284
The UTC also includes several instances where trustees have a mandatory obligation to provide information.285 Within sixty days of accepting a
trusteeship, the trustee must notify all qualified beneficiaries of the acceptance and provide contact information for the trustee.286 Also within sixty
days after a trustee obtains knowledge of either the creation of an irrevocable trust or a revocable trust becomes irrevocable, the trustee must notify
the qualified beneficiaries of the trust’s existence, the identity of the settlor,
and the right to request a copy of the trust.287
Distributees and permissible distributees of trust income must receive
an annual report on the trust property, liabilities, receipts, and disbursements.288 The UTC used the term “report” rather than the traditional term
“accounting” “in order to negate any inference that the report must be prepared in any particular format or with a high degree of formality.”289 The
qualified beneficiaries must be notified in advance of any change in the
method or rate of the trustee’s compensation.290

280. The trustee of a trust subject to court supervision, which could be requested by any
beneficiary or trustee, had to provide annual reports to the court. Id. § 59-04-17 (repealed 2007).
281. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 83, cmt. c (2003).
282. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-16-13(1).
283. Id.
284. Although N.D.C.C. section 59-14-03 limits the duties of a trustee of a revocable trust to
the settlor, N.D.C.C. section 59-16-08 exempts the reporting duties from that exclusion.
285. The obligation to make mandatory reports does not apply: to a trustee that accepts the
trusteeship before August 1, 2007; to irrevocable trusts created before August 1, 2007; or to trusts
that became irrevocable before August 1, 2007.
286. Id. § 59-16-13(2)(c).
287. Id. § 59-16-13(2)(d).
288. Id. § 59-16-13(2)(f). Other qualified and nonqualified beneficiaries may also request
copies of the report. Id.
289. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813 cmt.
290. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-16-13(2)(e).
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Trustee Liability

The remedies available when a trustee has breached a duty291 include
most of the commonly available court powers.292 The amount of damages a
trustee would pay is limited to “the greater of the amount required to restore
the value of the trust property and trust distributions to what they would
have been.”293 If the trustee made a profit because of the breach of trust,
the profit must be paid to the trust.294
The statute of limitations for a breach of trust action is one year from
the date the beneficiary receives a report that “adequately disclosed the
existence of a potential claim for breach.”295 If no report is given, a fiveyear statute of limitation applies starting from the removal, resignation, or
death of the trustee; the termination of the beneficiary’s interest; or the
termination of the trust.296
Many settlors include provisions, called exculpatory clauses, “that purport to relieve the trustee of liability for certain kinds of breaches of
trust.”297 At common law, exculpatory clauses in a trust were generally enforceable, at least to the extent they only relieved the trustee of liability for
negligence.298 The common law had many situations, however, where an
exculpatory clause was considered unenforceable as a violation of public
policy.299 The UTC codifies these exceptions and renders exculpatory
clauses unenforceable to the extent they protect the trustee from a breach
“committed in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the purposes of the
trust or was inserted as the result of an abuse by the trustee of a fiduciary or

291. If the trustee has not breached a duty under the trust, the trustee is not liable for any loss
or depreciation in the value of the trust property or for the failure of the trust to make a profit.
Id § 59-18-03.
292. Id. § 59-18-01(2). The court may: compel the trustee to perform the trustee’s duties;
enjoin the trustee from committing a breach of trust; compel the trustee to redress a breach of trust
by paying money, restoring property, or other means; order a trustee to account; appoint a special
fiduciary to take possession of the trust property and administer the trust; suspend the trustee;
remove the trustee as provided in N.D.C.C. section 59-15-06; reduce or deny compensation to the
trustee; subject to N.D.C.C. section 59-18-12, void an act of the trustee, impose a lien, or a constructive trust on trust property, or trace trust property wrongfully disposed of and recover the
property or its proceeds; or order any other appropriate relief.
293. Id. § 59-18-02(1).
294. Id.
295. Id. § 59-18-05(1). A report adequately discloses the potential claim “if it provides
sufficient information so that the beneficiary or representative knows of the potential claim or
should have inquired into its existence.” Id. § 59-18-05(2).
296. Id. § 59-18-05(3).
297. ASCHER ET AL., supra note 148, § 24.27.
298. Id.
299. Id. § 24.27.3 (“No matter how broad the provision, the trustee is liable for committing a
breach of trust in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the interests of the beneficiaries.”).
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confidential relationship to the settlor.”300 More importantly, if the trustee
caused the exculpatory clause to be in the trust, the clause is invalid unless
the trustee proves the clause was “fair under the circumstances and that its
existence and contents were adequately communicated to the settlor.”301
VII. CONCLUSION
The ULC undertook drafting of the UTC in order to codify the various
common law rules that applied to trusts, to clarify an area of law considered
“thin” and “fragmentary,” and to provide states with a body of law that was
“precise, comprehensive, and easily accessible.”302 It also aimed to bring
consistency among the states and offer “innovative” changes to existing
trust rules that did not work well.303 While North Dakota law was not a
hotbed of trust conflict, the UTC should bring additional clarity to situations where conflict arises. The coming generation of change in property
ownership, with a significant portion of property either in revocable trusts
or likely to be placed in trust in order to take advantage of the estate tax
credits, will surely increase the number of questions regarding trust formation, operation, and termination. By adopting the UTC, North Dakota has
placed itself ahead of the curve.

300. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-18-08(1).
301. Id. § 59-18-08(2). The clause will be enforceable if the settlor had independent legal
counsel. Id.
302. UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note (2005).
303. See id.

